The issues of Irish self-determination and Irish unity have unexpectedly been to the fore in recent weeks.
First of all, new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham visited the North for the first time on 27 August.
Prompted by a question on the prospects for a unity referendum, Burnham replied: “Well obviously I’m here as I said earlier to listen and I will take a collaborative approach, but some issues will be off the table and that is one issue that will be off the table.”
Expanding, he said that the referenda on Scottish independence and Brexit had been divisive distractions for issues such as the cost of living.
Predictably this prompted outrage from Irish nationalists, including Sinn Féin.
It also led to solemn assurances from Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Chris Bryant, that Burnham was referring only to whether a border poll would be discussed “now” and confirmed that both he and Burnham remained committed to every part of the Good Friday Agreement, including the provisions for a border-poll.
It is worth clarifying, however, what those provisions are. They do not, as is sometimes assumed, guarantee unfettered Irish self-determination.
First, the vote is not on an all-island basis but two votes, North and South. That gives the existing Northern Ireland, shaped at its creation to produce a permanent Unionist majority (now eroded), something of a veto.
Second, it is up to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, i.e. the British government, to determine when a poll is held.
Schedule 1 to the 1998 Northern Ireland Act provides the legal mechanism.
As the Constitution Society neatly explain: “Paragraph 1 provides that the Secretary of State may direct the holding of a poll. Paragraph 2 states that the Secretary of State must exercise that power if, at any time, it appears likely that a majority of those voting would favour Northern Ireland leaving the UK and forming part of a united Ireland.”
Clarified
As clarified by Re McCord [2020] in the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, “paragraph 2 duty arises even if the Secretary of State does not consider a referendum to be in the public interest. Concerns about division, pressure on public services or distraction from day-to-day government may legitimately inform the discretionary decision” but they “cannot displace the mandatory obligation once the likelihood test is satisfied.”
However, the British Government refuses to commit to any clear or objective criteria with which to measure the likelihood of a successful referendum. Therefore, they maintain maximum freedom of manoeuvre, which could effectively frustrate the calling of a vote without campaigning and pressure.
In other words, legally and morally it is not for Burnham to say that a vote is “off the table”. Practically, at the current juncture, and under the existing provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, his view reflects a certain reality and underscores the very limits of that Agreement.
Trump
The second prompt for discussions in Irish unity has, of course, been the comments from Trump.
Asked during a visit to Ireland about his view on Irish unity, on 12 September Trump said he would “love” to see a united Ireland and “it may as well happen now”.
Doubling down the following day, Trump added: “It seems to me that one of the naturals of all time is to put them together.”
It should not even need to be said that Trump has no concern for national self-determination, as his actions over Venezuela or Palestine, or his bullying of smaller states with punitive tariffs, make clear.
Trump’s remarks may just be of a piece with his characteristically capricious and unpredictable public utterances. With the risk of giving them deeper credence, they may also reflect an electoral calculation with Irish-American voters in the mid-terms. They may even be an example of using British weakspots to cause disruption and apply pressure, as the Israeli right have been supporting Argentina’s claim on the Falklands in response to Miliband’s sanctions move.
In any case, the answers to Burnham’s dismissal of a referendum and Trump’s incoherent support for unity are similar.
The settlement of the Irish national question should not be down to the British or US government or reduced to a facet of geopolitics.
Rather, if the issue is not simply to cause more division and strife between Irish workers, its resolution must be up to the Irish people, in all their diversity, and without external impediment, to come to a mutually satisfactory democratic arrangement.
As we have consistently argued, the workers’ movement must intervene with its own programme to resolve the national question, one which foregrounds the issue of rights and protections for national minorities and connects democratic demands to jobs, homes, social ownership and the ultimate creation of a Workers’ Republic.
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