Can Ukraine defeat Russia?

The spectacular results from Ukraine’s mid- and long-range drone campaign are visible daily on grainy feeds posted by Ukraine’s drone forces, and video footage on Western news platforms.

This year Ukraine has carried out strikes as far as 2,500km into Russia against fuel plants, munition factories and communication centres. Refineries in supposedly well-defended cities such as Moscow and St Petersberg have been seriously damaged by Ukrainian drones. Russian refineries have been hit 194 times in 2026. The immediate effect on the civilian population has been shortages of petrol in Russia alongside a price spike.

Super 95 petrol is now selling at the equivalent of €0.83 per litre and diesel at €0.94. A year ago the prices were €0.15 and €0.16, respectively. Reuters reports that some independent filling stations in Russia have now broken the hundred rouble barrier (€1.11) per litre.

Fights have broken out at Russian petrol stations.

The Ukrainian Air Force states that Russia has lost 43% of refining capacity in the last year and suffered $13bn of damage to oil infrastructure.

Fuel restrictions are in place across the country, Russia has banned the export of petrol, diesel and jet fuel and is importing petrol from Belarus and India.

Ukraine refers to the damage of Russian oil facilities as a “sanctions campaign”. And, as with all sanctions, it is necessary to distinguish between actions that will damage Russia’s economy and actions that will stop Putin’s war.

Putin has little interest in Russian suffering but he is concerned about political stability and so will have to make a response to the refinery fires.

More important than hitting oil facilities, a so-called “mid-range” Ukrainian drone campaign, striking targets up to 150km from the front lines, has been ongoing since January. The first phase, using improved drone systems, was to destroy Russian air defences in occupied areas. By the end of April Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) estimated they had destroyed 25 anti-aircraft missile sites and thirteen radar stations, costing Russia $1.1bn.

Ukraine benefited from Putin’s attempts to restrict Telegram use, often also used by military units as well as civilians, the prevention of Russia’s access to Starlink, and a deal with the US company Vantor which provides Ukrainian forces with near real-time satellite intelligence.

In the occupied areas of Crimea, southern and eastern Ukraine drones have been used to cut Russia’s supply lines. The road system that links Rostov-on-Don in Russia to Mariupol, Melitopol and Crimea, along the M-14 and M-18 roads, has been mostly closed to civilian traffic since late May and has become dominated by drones hunting Russian military vehicles and petrol tankers.

Surrendering

There are now reports of Russian troops in the occupied south surrendering because they have no water. The occupied town of Oleshky, facing Kherson city on the left bank of the Dnipro, appears to have been cut off.

Ukraine has now turned its attention to hitting Russian ships in the Sea of Azov. USF commander, Robert Brovdi, claims 19 tankers, a cargo ship and a ferry were hit between 6 and 8 July. Ukraine adds that some of the tankers were carrying fuel to Crimea. Petrol sales to civilians in Crimea have now been banned.

The airspace is allegedly extremely well-defended, so Ukraine’s ability, currently, to attack at will is impressive.

Ukraine has also hit electricity substations, causing repeated and widespread blackouts across Crimea. This type of action is questionable: the rules of war rightly state that attacks on civilian infrastructure are crimes, and while military bases in Crimea will have alternative or back-up power sources available, civilians will not.

Ukraine has attempted to isolate Crimea by destroying bridges and roads into the area. It is not clear what Ukraine intends next. They could simply attempt to throttle Crimea. But Ukraine also appears to be concentrating some of its best units south of Zaporizhzhia, and although a massed armoured assault south towards Crimea is unlikely, it may be that Ukraine has something less conventional in mind.

So, will Ukraine win?

In an article in the Telegraph, former head of Ukraine’s armed force, now Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK, Valerii Zaluzhnii, issues a useful corrective (8 July): “A growing number of Western analysts now argue that Russia has effectively lost the war… This is a dangerous misreading of the war… This is [now] a war of attrition… Ukraine remains dependent on Western financial assistance and military support… Moscow understands this and [aims to] exhaust Ukraine. Russia has reserves of manpower and industrial capacity.”

Meanwhile, like an emperor obsessed with signalling status and power US President Donald Trump rolled up to the Ankara NATO summit on 7 July with an entourage of 1,400 people. One person, apparently, even had the job of collecting Trump’s pee and shit so no one else could gather it up and run an analysis on it.

It seems Putin has a man with a suitcase who follows him round with exactly the same job.

Putin had hoped that Trump would press Ukraine to stop the drone offensive. In fact, in Ankara, Trump said he thought Ukraine’s recent successes could bring about a peace agreement as Putin was now under significant domestic pressure.

Yes, an agreement may be possible. But much more likely is a major escalation by Putin.

At the NATO summit Trump promised Ukraine a licence to produce Patriot missiles. Even if Trump doesn’t change his mind this is no solution to the crisis facing Ukraine. Such production will take years to organise.

Battered

On the nights of 2, 6, 8, 11 July Kyiv was battered by massive Russian drone and missile attacks killing at least 27 people. In the latest of those barrages Russia fired six ballistic missiles, four cruise missiles and 121 drones.

None of the missiles fired on 6 July were intercepted underlining the lack of Ukrainian anti-missile defences. Some of the Russian missiles knocked down whole streets, and Ukraine, currently starved of Patriot missiles, has no answer.

According to military analyst Mick Ryan, Russia is able to produce 7-800 ballistic missiles each year. Given, on average, each incoming missile requires 2-3 interceptors to guarantee ballistic missile destruction, pro-Ukraine states would have to provide over 2,000 missiles, a figure which is probably impossible, even given a will which does not currently exist.

The Russian spring offensive which had the objective of overrunning the entire Donbas region (it currently occupies 80% of Donetsk) has failed and Russian forces have gained only 97 sq km in the first six months of 2026, at enormous human cost. Russian casualties now stand at 1.4mn since February 2022, including 450,000 killed. Russia is losing soldiers at a rate of over 30,000 per month which is more than the 27,000 it recruits.

On 3 July Putin appeared on Russian television with his key generals who lyingly stated that Russia had taken 3000 sq km of territory in 2026, claiming to now control the Ukrainian Fortress Belt towns of Kupiansk and Kostiantynivka. The US Institute for the Study of War assesses Russian forces have infiltrated only 2 percent of Kupiansk and 37 of Kostiantynivka.

The Russian : Ukrainian casualty rates now stand at 8 : 1, with the important caveat that Russia finds it much easier to recruit additional troops than Ukraine which remains much smaller by population, resources and GDP per capita.

Ukraine seems to be looking to negotiate with Russia in the summer when it will be strongest, having caused maximum disruption by then. Russia prefers September, before the US mid-terms and after Russia’s scheduled Duma elections, for its own political advantage; even more likely is that Putin rides out discomfort now in the hope that Russia can inflict vast damage to Ukrainian cities and, over the next winter, destroy what remains of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

What would an escalation by Putin look like?

• Vast destruction of Ukrainian cities.

• Russia continues to try to drag a reluctant Belarus into the war. Belarus is building military infrastructure along its southern border with Ukraine.

• US intelligence has warned Poland that it should expect some sort of Russian attack. A direct, conventional military attack is unlikely. But there are plenty of other possible routes: destruction of infrastructure, cyber attacks, assassinations.

• After the September elections Putin could announce a new mobilisation into the army.

So, Russia has not yet lost in any sense. What is particularly important is continued European and Canadian funding for Ukraine. A large €90bn loan from the EU is being rolled out beginning in late June.

Most importantly Europe must arm Ukraine to be able to effectively defend itself.

Our role, on the internationalist Marxist left, is to advocate for the Ukrainian workers and to help, whenever we can, the fight for an independent, working-class, socialist movement in Ukraine.

Solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian working class! §