The term āemotional labourā is now widely used in left-wing circles. Indeed, it is often stretched to mean seemingly any emotionally demanding human activity. For example, in the context of student activism, one might hear it used to denote the act of suppressing personal frustration whilst explaining an experienced aspect of oppression to others.
Such use of āemotional labourā extends the concept far beyond what Arlie Russell Hochschild meant when she coined the term in her 1983 book The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling , now a classic text in the sociology of emotions.
To be clear, this is not simply a difference between lay and professional uses of the term. Many social scientists have pushed emotional labourās conceptual boundaries over the decades. Nevertheless, I believe that expanding the notion of emotional labour significantly beyond its original contours risks losing much of what made it analytically useful to begin with.
Specifically, Hochschild used āemotional labourā to denote āthe management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily displayā that is āsold for a wage and therefore has exchange valueā. Such labour ārequires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others...and it sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individualityā.
In other words, emotional labour frequently involves a certain estrangement from an aspect of oneās self. This recalls Erich Frommās remark, in Marxās Concept of Man , that the salesman might be āeven more alienated today than the skilled manual workerā because he is āforced to sell his āpersonality,ā his smile, his opinions in the bargainā.
Hoschchild formulated the concept of emotional labour in the course of her empirical research on workers whose occupations require them to learn and use emotional management techniques. She especially draws on her detailed case study of flight attendants, whose gender ratio at the time was even more disproportionately female than it is today. Many of the bookās most insightful moments are in its examination of (i) the often hidden personal costs of regularly managing oneās emotions for commercial purposes and (ii) the inventive strategies workers employ to cope with these costs:
"Among themselves, flight attendants build up an alternative way of experiencing a smile or the word āgirlā ā a way that involves anger and joking and mutual support on the job. And in their private lives ā driving back home on the freeway, talking quietly with a loved one, sorting it out in the occasional intimacy of a worker-to-worker talk ā they separate the companyās meaning of anger from their own meaning, the company rules of feeling from their own. They try to reclaim the managed heart.ā
Despite Hochschildās use of Marxian terminology, her direct inspiration came from the work of the American sociologist C. Wright Mills, especially his 1951 book White Collar: The American Middle Classes. Still, one can understand why the concept of emotional labour is important to Marxist and feminist writers.
Women are overrepresented in service jobs that demand friendliness and deference to customers. In occupations where the self-management of feeling is not part of oneās regular work, womenās additional emotional labour tends to go unremunerated, which partly contributes to the gender pay gap.
In both cases, this is because of the sexist assumption that, as women are just ābetter at emotionsā, it is ānaturalā for women to perform emotional labour, especially where it involves care or empathy. Far from reflecting an inherent predisposition or skill, the way that women are disproportionately expected to be emotional managers is itself part of the social construction of gender.
In Hochschildās terminology, the act of regulating oneās emotions in a private setting without a wage and without producing exchange value is āemotion workā rather than āemotional labourā. This can occur in ritualistic situations where the participant is expected to feel a certain way, such as when a bride internally prompts herself to feel happy at her wedding. Emotion work is also commonly performed when trying to maintain relationships, including in the household.
This brings us back to the issue of extending the boundaries of āemotional labourā into what Hochschild instead termed āemotion workā.
Emotional labour justifiably has some conceptual elasticity. Firstly, there are occupations such as fashion modelling where one is often compelled to continue honing job-related emotional management techniques far beyond oneās working hours because oneās employability depends on it.
Secondly, one could argue that, even where there is no direct link between the management of oneās emotions and the production of exchange value, private emotion work is still central to capitalism: it is part of the process that enables the workforce to turn up at work each day to generate profit and should therefore be considered labour. One could conceptualise this in terms of emotion work producing exchange value indirectly or in terms of emotion work reproducing the capital relation.
Thirdly, dependence on oneās partner or family for shelter, finances, etc, creates a strong compulsion to manage oneās emotions in both the household and the workplace. Women are especially likely to experience this. One sees it in cases of male-to-female domestic violence where women make themselves focus on their abusive partnerās āpositive sideā in order to preserve their relationship and, by extension, their material security.
Nevertheless, the conceptual elasticity of emotional labour should have limits. The more one stretches āemotional labourā to cover any activity involving emotional exertion, the more it obscures the very kind of exploitation, alienation, and dependency under capitalism that the term was supposed to highlight in the first place.
As for the suggestion that all emotion management should be considered labour because it is central to capitalism, this conflates the act of producing the preconditions for value-creation with the act of value-creation itself. Such conflation obscures how, by bringing workers together at the point of production and giving them common material interests, wage-labour in the workplace (including waged emotional labour) produces a collective subject in a way that private emotion work performed in isolation cannot.
Additionally, the conceptual overstretching of emotional labour can easily serve as a cynical excuse for derogations of responsibility in the context of political organising. That is, it makes it easier for activists to refuse to perform an agreed task that they find taxing or unpleasant by hyperbolically claiming it to be āemotional labourā.
In the decades since The Managed Heart ās publication, we have seen the growth of new jobs in the care sector and the emergence of a āmarketised private lifeā in the space between home and work, where family tasks are increasingly āoutsourcedā commercially. All this raises pressing questions for us as socialist feminists and labour organisers.
More than ever, emotional labour is a crucial instrument in our conceptual toolkit, but we should always exercise informed judgement as to whether it is the appropriate tool for the job.
ā¢ Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (University of California Press 2012)
ā¢ For a recent interview with Hochschild on the conceptual stretching of emotional labour, and what she now thinks is and is not emotional labour, see Julie Beck, āThe Concept Creep of āEmotional Laborāā (The Atlantic, 26 November 2018)
