

Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*



These excerpts are designed to focus discussion. If studying the book in a group, you can go round the group taking turns to explicate one of the excerpts from the chapters you're studying that session, then talking about follow-up questions. If studying individually, you can read through each chapter, then write your own notes explicating the excerpts from that chapter (and identifying important points from the chapter not reflected in or alluded to the excerpts). Only one English translation of the book is current, but different editions have different chapter numberings (either continuous, nos. 1-48, or volume by volume).

1: BEFORE FEBRUARY 1917: CHAPTERS 1-6 (+ "Appendix" to chapter 1)

C1

"From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law... of combined development... The fundamental... feature of Russian history is the slow tempo of her development, with the economic backwardness, primitiveness of social forms and low level of culture resulting from it... [Yet] Russian industry in its technique and capitalist structure stood at the level of the advanced countries, and in certain respects even outstripped them".

"The Russian workers [were] hospitable to the boldest conclusions of revolutionary thought". But the Russian bourgeoisie? "Political isolation and anti-popular character".

"In its initial task the Russian revolution was thus a democratic revolution. But it posed the problem of political democracy in a new way."

C2

"The participation of Russia [in World War 1] [fell] somewhere halfway between the participation of France and that of China".

"Liberalism at the beginning of the counter-revolutionary period [after 1905-6] had raised the banner of imperialism. One thing flowed from another: once it proved impossible to purge the country of the feudal rubbish in order to assure to the bourgeoisie a dominant position, it remained to form a union with the monarchy and the nobility in order to assure to capital the best position in the world market... [As the war went poorly] liberalism... accuse[d] the court party of Germanophilism and of preparing a separate peace". At the same time, "probably all the leaders of the... Kadets... were convinced that Russia was unable to continue the war".

C3

"The first half-year of 1914 clearly approaches in the number of political strikes the culminating point of [1905]. But... the first war months are marked by political inertness in the working class... In the factories in those days nobody dared to call himself 'Bolshevik' for fear not only of arrest, but of a beating from the backward workers".

"By the end of 1916... the curve of the workers' movement rises sharply... A wave of meetings runs through the factories".

"The broadest gates were opened for the emerging of capitalist farmers from the peasant class by the law of November 9, 1906, the chief reform introduced by the victorious counter-revolution... an explosive capitalist shell directed against the commune... It was easier to propose such a task, however, than to achieve it".

"The village... remained comparatively peaceful during the war... because its active forces were at the front".

C4

"Although the monarchy did under compulsion make concessions to the new forces, nevertheless inwardly it completely failed to become modernised. On the contrary it withdrew into itself. Its spirit of mediaevalism thickened under the pressure of hostility and fear".

C5

"The murder of Rasputin played a colossal role, but... it did not weaken the crisis, but sharpened it."

C6

"Czarism [made] concessions... when they were demanded by the necessity of self-preservation... For czarism, however, all these reforms had a meaning only in so far as the partial concession preserved the whole – that is, the foundations of a caste society and the monarchy itself".

"How could Russia with her belated development, coming along at the tail end of the European nations, with her meagre economic foundation underfoot... develop an 'elastic conservatism' of social forms?" [like Britain's]

2. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION: CHAPTERS 7-9

C7

"The 23rd of February was International Woman's Day... It had not occurred to anyone that it might become the first day of the revolution... In spite of all directives, the women textile workers in several factories went on strike, and sent delegates to the metal workers with an appeal for support".

"Toward the police the crowd showed ferocious hatred... [while] exchanging friendly words with the army men".

[The government had] "a very exact plan for crushing a new insurrection... The difficulty lay not in lack of foresight, nor defects of the plan itself, but in the human material".

"In the course of the [25th] students of the higher schools join the strike... the Cossacks let go a volley at the horse... police..."
"Women workers... go up to the cordons more boldly than men".

"A revolutionary uprising that spreads over a number of days can develop victoriously only in case it ascends step by step, and scores one success after another. A pause in its growth is dangerous; a prolonged marking of time, fatal... It is possible to let slip a victory at the very moment when it is within arm's reach".

"The central Bolshevik staff, composed of Shliapnikov, Zalutsky and Molotov was amazing in its helplessness and lack of initiative".

"The more the soldiers in their mass are convinced that the rebels are really rebelling... that this is a struggle to the death, that the people may win if they join them... the more willing they are to turn aside their bayonets, or go over with them to the people. In other words, the revolutionists can create a break in the soldiers' mood only if they themselves are actually ready to seize the victory at any price whatever, even the price of blood... One after another, from early morning [on 27 Feb], the Reserve Guard battalions mutinied before they were led out of the barracks... The czarist garrison of the capital, numbering 150,000 soldiers, was dwindling, melting, disappearing".

C8

"The overturn in Moscow was only an echo of the insurrection in Petrograd... neither armed encounters nor casualties: Petrograd answered for Moscow. In a series of provincial cities the movement began only on March 1... News of the revolution trickled into the villages from the nearby cities... The villages accepted the revolution more slowly and less enthusiastically than the cities, but felt it no less deeply... Petrograd achieved the February revolution. The rest of the country adhered to it. There was no struggle anywhere except in Petrograd".

"The revolution was carried out upon the initiative and by the strength of one city, constituting approximately about 1/75 of the population of the country. You may say, if you will, that this most gigantic democratic act was achieved in a most undemocratic manner... In the initiatory role of the centres there is no violation of democracy, but rather its dynamic realisation".

"The mystic doctrine of spontaneousness explains nothing... It was necessary that there should be not masses in the abstract, but masses of Petrograd workers and Russian workers in general, who had passed through [various experiences, and] throughout this mass should be scattered workers who had thought over the experience of 1905, criticised the constitutional illusions of the liberals and Mensheviks, assimilated the perspectives of the revolution... – workers capable of making revolutionary inferences from what they observed and communicating them to others. And finally, it was necessary that there should be in the troops of the garrison itself progressive soldiers, seized, or at least touched, in the past by revolutionary propaganda".

"The insurrection triumphed... Why and how did the power turn up in the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie?... Kerensky came running into the [Duma] hall in high excitement: An enormous crowd of people and soldiers is coming... and intends to demand of the Duma that it seize the power in its hands!... Kerensky's announcement is met with 'general bewilderment and dismayed looks'."

"The Mensheviks... straightway formed a 'Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies', which in the course of the day was filled out principally with former revolutionists who had lost connection with the masses but still preserved their 'names'. This Executive Committee, including also Bolsheviks in its staff summoned the workers to elect deputies at once. The first session... met at nine o'clock and ratified the staff of the Executive Committee".

"The leaders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, created during that day, had already appeared before the Provisional Committee [of members of the Duma] and insistently demanded that it take the power into its hands. This friendly push had its effect" [at 11pm].

"The question is here of a new capitalist type of petty bourgeoisie, of industrial, commercial and bank clerks, the functionaries of capital on one side, and the workers' bureaucracy on the other... In order to answer the question how a revolution of workers and peasants came to surrender the power to the bourgeoisie, it is necessary to introduce into the political chain an intermediate link: the... journalists and politicians of the new middle caste, who had taught the masses that the bourgeoisie is an enemy, but themselves feared more than any thing else to release the masses from the control of that enemy. The contradiction between the character of the revolution and the character of the power that issued from it, is explained by the contradictory character of this new petty bourgeois partition-wall between the revolutionary masses and the capitalist bourgeoisie".

In the Soviet "the workers elected socialists [but]... made almost no distinction between the three socialist parties. And since the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries comprised infinitely larger ranks of the intelligentsia... the elections, even in shops and factories, gave them an enormous majority".

"Those democrats, 'socialists'... [the democracy] called itself, and even deemed itself 'socialistic', in order to disguise not only from the masses, but from itself too, its actual rôle: without this self-inebriation it could not have fulfilled this rôle".

3. DUAL POWER. THE WAR AND THE ARMY AFTER FEBRUARY: CHAPTERS 10-14

"The [Provisional] Committee [at first] confined itself to the naming of commissars from the membership of the Duma to the principal governmental departments... [the commissar for] the Ministry of the Interior... issued on March 1 an order for the arrest of all police officials, public, secret and political. This ferocious revolutionary gesture was purely platonic in character, for the police were already being arrested..."

"On the 1st March the Provisional Committee undertook the formation of a ministry... With one single exception, the revolution accomplished by workers and soldiers found no reflection whatever in the staff of the revolutionary government. The exception was Kerensky".

"The leaders of the Executive Committee refused him their official sanction... the Executive Committee had already expressed itself against its members entering the government... [Kerensky] appeared at a plenary session of the Soviet – chaotic meetings in those days – ... and spoke of his general readiness to die for the revolution, and his more immediate readiness to take the portfolio of Minister of Justice... There was no vote. Kerensky decided to interpret the applause as a vote of confidence. In a way he was right".

The Soviet Executive "announced that it intended to support the new power only in so far as it should truly serve the democratic revolution".

"The masses went over in droves to the socialists, whom they identified with the Soviet. Not only the workers and soldiers of the enormous garrisons in the rear, but all the many-coloured small people of the towns... Property owners of all kinds and tendencies gathered around the banner of the Kadet Party..."

"In the Tauride Palace there were two halves: the Duma and the Soviet. The Executive Committee was at first crowded into some narrow secretarial chambers, through which flowed an uninterrupted human flood. The deputies of the Duma tried to feel like proprietors in their sumptuous chambers. But the barriers were soon swept away by the overflow of the revolution... The Soviet spread out irresistibly, and the Duma was crowded away into the back yard..."

"Property is a relation among people. It represents an enormous power so long as it is universally recognised and supported by that system of compulsion called Law and the State. But the very essence of the present situation was that the old state had suddenly

collapsed, and the entire old system of rights had been called in question by the masses..."

C11

"A single government, the necessary condition of stability in any régime, is preserved so long as the ruling class succeeds in putting over its economic and political forms upon the whole of society as the only forms possible".

Dual power "is not a constitutional, but a revolutionary fact. It implies that a destruction of the social equilibrium has already split the state superstructure".

"In the revolution of 1917, we see the official democracy consciously and intentionally creating a two-power system, dodging with all its might the transfer of power into its own hands. The double sovereignty is created, or so it seems at a glance, not as a result of a struggle of classes for power, but as the result of a voluntary 'yielding' of power by one class to another".

C12

"As early as March 3, meetings of soldiers and workers began to demand that the Soviet depose forthwith the Provisional Government of the liberal bourgeoisie, and take the power in its own hands... But this agitation was soon broken off".

"Already early in March, soviets were coming into being in all the principal towns and industrial centres. From these they spread in the next few weeks throughout the country. They began to arrive in the villages only in April and May... The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet actually acquired a state significance. The other soviets guided themselves by the capital... A month after the overthrow of the autocracy a first conference of soviets was summoned... The conference filled out the Petrograd Executive Committee with sixteen conservative provincials, thus legitimising its state character."

"In contrast to the Mensheviks who remained always a party of the cities, the Social Revolutionaries had found, it seemed, an amazingly powerful support in the country. More than that, they dominated even in the cities... [But] in the Menshevik-Social Revolutionary bloc the dominant place belonged to the Mensheviks, in spite of the weight of numbers on the side of the Social Revolutionaries..."

"The broader circles of old Mensheviks... had inscribed themselves in the camp of Zimmerwald and refused to accept responsibility for the war. But... the February revolution reconciled a majority of those Zimmerwaldists to the war, which from now on they discovered to be a struggle in defence of the revolution... Standing at the head of the left wing of the Mensheviks, which did not rise to any serious rôle in the revolution, Martov remained in opposition to the policy of Tseretelli and Dan..."

[At this stage] "the struggle of parties in the Soviet was extremely peaceable in character... It is true that with the arrival of Tseretelli from exile (March 19) the Soviet leadership took a rather sharp turn toward the right – toward direct responsibility for the government and the war. But the Bolsheviks also toward the middle of March, under the influence of Kamenev and Stalin who had arrived from exile, swung sharply to the right, so that the distance between the Soviet majority and its left opposition had become by the beginning of April even less than it was at the beginning of March".

"The Soviet apparatus began involuntarily, automatically, against the will of the Soviet, to crowd out the official governmental machine, which was grinding more and more without grain... 'It became necessary to reconcile oneself and take up the separate functions of administration', [a Menshevik] sadly confesses, 'at the same time preserving the fiction that the [Prov. Gov't] was performing them'".

"The eight-hour working day was the great test of strength and mutual relations. The insurrection had conquered, but the general strike continued... The Executive Committee designated March 5 as the date for resuming work... A considerable number of shops openly refused to submit... The workers were of course ready to return to the shops... - but upon what terms? They demanded the eight-hour day..."

"'For the working class', [the Mensheviks responded], 'social questions are not now of the first importance. Its present task is to achieve political freedom'... A furious campaign was opening under liberal leadership against the workers... to turn the soldiers against them... On the initiative of the workers there began regular visits by the troops... to the factories... The workers demonstrated and explained... The events connected with this struggle for the eight-hour day had an immense significance for the whole future development of the revolution. The workers had gained a few free hours a week for reading, for meetings, and also for practice with the rifle... The treacherous design of the demagogues turned against its own inspirers. Instead of alienation and hostility, they got a closer welding together of workers and soldiers."

"The soviet form does not contain any mystic power. It is by no means free from the faults of every representative system... But its strength lies in that it reduces all these faults to a minimum... Of all the forms of revolutionary representation, the soviet is the most flexible, immediate and transparent. But still it is only a form. It cannot give more than the masses are capable of putting into it at a

given moment. Beyond that, it can only assist the masses in understanding the mistakes they have made and correcting them".

In mid-April, "everything seemed nicely and permanently settled. Tseretelli dominated in the Soviet without limit. Kerensky was riding higher and higher..."

C13

"The liberals had no other ground for calling the February revolution bloodless except that it gave them the power... In Kronstadt the revolution was accompanied by an outbreak of bloody vengeance against the officers... In the land forces too there were bloody encounters, several waves of them... The Bolsheviks went out to try to restrain the soldiers from excesses as often as the Conciliators... Although they were quick with cruel reprisals, the soldiers were also inclined to childlike trustfulness and self-forgetful acts of gratitude".

"Deserting, extraordinarily frequent on the eve of the revolution, was very infrequent in the first weeks after. The army was waiting. In the hope that the revolution would give peace, the soldier did not refuse to put a shoulder under the front: Otherwise, he thought, the new government won't be able to conclude a peace... 'We mustn't stick our bayonets in the ground!' Under the influence of obscure and contradictory moods the soldiers those days frequently refused even to listen to the Bolsheviks..."

"The fundamental psychological process taking place in the army was the awakening of personality... This flood of mass individualism, so hateful to the bourgeoisie, was due to the very character of the February revolution, to the fact that it was a bourgeois revolution. But that was not its only content, either. For besides the peasant and his soldier son, the worker took part in this revolution. The worker had long ago felt himself a personality, and he entered into the war not only with hatred of it, but also with the thought of struggling against it".

C14

"The [bourgeois liberals'] concern of the moment was not to secure advantageous international conditions for bourgeois Russia, but to save the bourgeois régime itself, even at the price of Russia's further enfeeblement. 'First we must recover', said this heavily wounded class. 'After that we will put things in order'... To keep up the war hypnosis and the mood of chauvinism was the only possible way the bourgeoisie could maintain their hold upon the masses – especially upon the army – against the so-called 'deepeners' of the revolution".

"In the first days the... Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries did not know what to do with the war... After some weeks of wavering... these half-hearted democrats calling themselves socialists were hitched up in the war harness, and under the whip of the liberals tried with all their tiny strength to guarantee victory..."

In the first days, though, "in the heated atmosphere of those hours... there was born the famous Order No.1 – the single worthy document of the February revolution, a charter of the freedom of the revolutionary army... that elective committees shall be formed in all military regiments; soldiers' deputies shall be elected to the Soviet; in all political acts the soldiers shall submit to the Soviet and its committees; weapons shall be in the control of the regimental and battalion committees, and shall 'in no case be given up to the officer'; on duty, the severest military discipline – off duty, complete citizens' rights; saluting off duty and titling of officers are abolished; uncivil treatment of soldiers is forbidden..."

"On the 14th of March, the Executive Committee introduced into the Soviet the project of a manifesto... [it] of course expressed a desire for peace, and moreover a democratic peace without annexations or indemnities. But... the Soviet document, to which one cannot deny a rather simple sincerity of motive, dropped with fatal perfection into the well-worn rut of official French hypocrisy... While turning over the leadership of foreign policy to Miliukov, who had been scheming not long before to convert East Prussia into a Russian province, the leaders of the Soviet summoned the German and Austro-Hungarian workers to follow the lead of the Russian revolution... If the Russian liberals nevertheless at times fiercely attacked the manifesto, and the French censorship would not let it through, that was merely due to a fear of the interpretation which would be given it by revolutionary but still trustful masses... [In the soviets], even in the Urals and in Kostroma, where the Bolsheviks were strong, the patriotic manifesto received unanimous approval".

4. THE APRIL THESES, THE "APRIL DAYS", THE PEASANTRY, THE JUNE OFFENSIVE: CHAPTERS 15-23 (and "Appendices" to chapter 16 and 22)

C15

"In the programme announcement of the new editorship [of the Bolshevik paper, on 15 March], it was declared that the Bolsheviks would decisively support the Provisional Government 'in so far as it struggles against reaction or counter-revolution'... 'Our slogan is not the meaningless "down with war". Our slogan is pressure upon the Provisional Government with the aim of compelling it ... to make an attempt to induce all the warring countries to open immediate negotiations..."

"The next day [after arriving in St Petersburg] Lenin presented... [the] Theses of April 4... The republic which has issued from the February revolution is not our republic, and the war which it is now waging is not our war. The task of the Bolsheviks is to overthrow

the imperialist government. But this government rests upon the support of the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who in turn are supported by the trustfulness of the masses of the people. We are in the minority. In these circumstances there can be no talk of violence from our side... 'We must patiently explain'... We will break absolutely with capital, publish its secret treaties, and summon the workers of the whole world to cast loose from the bourgeoisie and put an end to the war. We are beginning the international revolution... 'We don't need any parliamentary republic. We don't need any bourgeois democracy. We don't need any government except the Soviet of workers', soldiers', and farmhands' deputies!'"

"These theses of Lenin were published in his own name and his only... Nobody – not one organisation, group or individual – affixed his signature to them".

C16

"From the year 1905 the Bolshevik Party had waged a struggle against the autocracy under the slogan 'Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry'... Only the proletariat and peasantry in close union could carry through a democratic revolution against the monarchy and the landlords... a ruthless cleansing of the Augean stables of medievalism".

After February, "the Bolshevik staff in Russia continued to stand by the old formula and regarded the February revolution, notwithstanding its obvious establishment of two incompatible régimes, merely as the first stage of a bourgeois revolution... After this Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie 'exhausts itself', then a democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants will be established as the forerunner of the bourgeois parliamentary régime..."

"The April Theses of Lenin were condemned as Trotskyist... The opponents of Lenin justly asserted that the democratic revolution as a whole was not finished, and hence, they concluded, there is no place for a dictatorship of the proletariat..."

Lenin won a majority in about 3 weeks. How? "Lenin's actual influence in the party was indubitably very great, but it was by no means unlimited... Speaking on the report of Lenin to the conference, a woman delegate [said]: 'The prognosis made by the Bolsheviks proved wrong, but their tactics were right'. In his April theses which seemed so paradoxical, Lenin was relying against the old formula upon the living tradition of the party – its irreconcilable attitude to the ruling classes and its hostility to all half-way measures – whereas the 'old Bolsheviks' were opposing [an] outdated memory to the concrete development of the class struggle".

"It was on [the] stratum of workers decisively risen to their feet during the upward years of 1912-14 that Lenin was now banking... Although separated from these workers by two war fronts, and almost without communication, Lenin had never lost touch with them. 'Let the war, jails, Siberia, hard labour, shatter them twice, ten times, you cannot destroy that stratum. It is alive. It is imbued with revolutionism and anti-chauvinism'."

"At the very end of the [24-29 April Bolshevik] conference... Zinoviev introduced... a resolution: 'To take part in the international conference... at Stockholm'. The report says: 'Adopted by all votes against one'. That one was Lenin".

C17

"Tseretelli proposed that [the Soviet Executive] demand from the Provisional Government that it despatch a note to the Allies... Miliukov agreed [but] his note... urged that the peace-loving phrases of the government should not give anyone 'the slightest reason to think that the revolution which had occurred entailed a weakening of the rôle of Russia in the common struggle of the Allies...' and expressed confidence that the victors 'will find a means to attain those guarantees and sanctions, which are necessary...' That word about 'guarantees and sanctions'... meant nothing less in the thieves' jargon of diplomacy, especially French, than annexations and indemnities. On the day of the May 1 celebration [18 April in the Russian calendar] Miliukov telegraphed his note, composed at the dictation of Allied diplomats, to the governments of the Entente. And only after this was it sent to the Executive Committee..."

"The masses came out into the streets with arms in their hands... 'Down with Miliukov'... Historians call this movement 'spontaneous' in the conditional sense that no party took the initiative in it..."

"The Bolsheviks... placards... 'Down with the Provisional Government!'... The party Central Committee... declared on April 21 that they considered the Soviet's veto of [further] demonstrations perfectly in order... 'The motto "Down with the Provisional Government" is incorrect at present... [Lenin said] 'the Petrograd Committee aimed a wee bit too far to the left ... Along with the correct slogan, 'Long Live the Soviets!' they gave a wrong one, 'Down with the Provisional Government'. A moment of action is no time to aim 'a wee bit too far to the left'..."

"On the evening of the 21st [in] the Petrograd Soviet... Kamenev, in the name of the Bolsheviks, proposed the formation of a purely soviet government... But [the]... solacing resolution of the Executive Committee was adopted by an enormous majority against 18... In Moscow the vote of 'no confidence' in the Provisional Government, introduced by the Bolsheviks on April 22, mustered only 74 votes out of many hundreds".

"An energetic campaign... was carried on for the re-election of representatives to the [Petrograd] soviet of workers' deputies... at the beginning of May the Bolsheviks had behind them a third of the Petrograd proletariat".

C18

"At the end of the April days the [Mensheviks and SRs] had no thought of a coalition [government]... [But] the masses, in so far as they were not yet for the Bolsheviks, stood solid for the entrance of socialists into the government..."

"On the 1st of May the Executive Committee, having passed through... vacillation... decided by a majority of 41 votes against 18... to enter into a coalition government. Only the Bolsheviks and a small group of Menshevik-Internationalists voted against it... The socialists appropriated six portfolios out of fifteen... Prince Lvov remained premier..."

"The new city dumas... had been elected upon the widest possible franchise... The majority, immense as usual, belonged to the SRs and Mensheviks... And nevertheless the power remained with the soviets. The dumas turned out to be in the essence of the matter municipal commissions of the soviets".

C19

"On June 9, Lenin announced at the congress of the soviets: 'When they say that we are striving for a separate peace, that is not true. We say: No separate peace, not with any capitalists, and least of all with the Russian capitalists. But the Provisional Government has made a separate peace with the Russian capitalists. Down with that separate peace!'"

"The soviet congress [decided] in favour of the offensive... On June 16, in an order to the army and the fleet, Kerensky... concluded with the words 'I command you – forward!'"

"The mood of the soldiers... 'If we advance and overthrow the enemy then we will be close to the wished-for peace... Having been dragged into [the offensive] by a combination of force, moral pressure, and most of all deceit, they so much the more indignantly turned back [when it started going badly]'."

C20

"In the first weeks after the February revolution, the village remained almost inert... Toward the end of March there began to flow into the capital the first alarming tidings of the peasants' entrance upon the scene... In the first period, from March to July, the peasants in their overwhelming majority are still refraining from direct acts of violence against the landlords, and from open seizures of the land".

"Hoping little from the new power, the landlords hastened to dispose of their properties. The kulaks began zealously to buy up these estates... The villages... demand: stop all land sales by decree".

"The leading role in the peasant movement was played by the soldier, who brought home from the front and from the city barracks a spirit of initiative".

"There begins a movement of the communal peasants... against the strong peasants... who had detached themselves and taken up individual holdings on the basis of Stolypin's law of November 9, 1906".

"The act creating land committees as organs of preparation for agrarian reform was published by the first Minister of Agriculture". But they became central.

"An All-Russian Peasant Congress was convoked in Petrograd at the beginning of May... The Social Revolutionaries dominated this congress absolutely, and moreover in the person of their extreme right wing. At times, however, even they paused in fright before the reeking mixture of land greed and political 'blackhundred-ism' which exuded from some of the deputies. In regard to the landlord problem an extremely radical position was formulated by this congress: 'Conversion of all land into national property for equal working use, without any indemnity... But the matter did not move forward a step. The Provisional Government... would not agree to lay a hand on the landlords' estates. The socialists did not want to lay a hand on the Provisional Government".

"On the 20th of May, Lenin spoke at the Peasant Congress. It seemed... as though Lenin had landed in a pit of crocodiles... Lenin's way of posing the question... the instruments of the agrarian revolution, and primarily of the seizure of the landed estates, were to be the soviets of peasants' deputies with the land committees subject to them... Lenin said on April 28 'We favour an immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, with the highest degree of organisation possible. We are absolutely against anarchist

seizures'."

"The agrarian movement', [Lenin] he said on April 14, 'is only a prophecy, not a fact... We must be prepared for a union of the peasantry with the bourgeoisie'... But the more favourable variant was realised. The agrarian movement... became a fact, revealing for a brief moment, but with extraordinary force, the superiority of the caste ties of the peasantry over the capitalistic antagonisms... The land committees... became the instruments of the whole peasantry, who with their heavy-handed pressure converted them from chambers of conciliation into weapons of agrarian revolution".

C21

Food supplies poor, factories being shut down. "The economic department of the Executive Committee had worked out a broad programme of state regulation of the economic life... 'state trade monopol[ies]... state trusts (coal, oil, metals, sugar, paper)... regulative participation of the state in the distribution of raw materials... place under control... all credit institutions'... 'The programme is excellent', wrote Lenin... However, the whole question was: Who was to carry out this excellent programme?"

"The proletariat was the chief motive force of revolution. At the same time the revolution was giving shape to the proletariat. And the proletariat was badly in need of this".

"The factory and shop committees, waging a struggle for the life of their factories against the sabotage of the administration and the proprietors, went over to the Bolsheviks much sooner than the Soviet. At a conference of the factory and shop committees of Petrograd and its environs at the beginning of June, the Bolshevik resolution won 335 out of 421 votes".

"At the June conference of trade unions it became known that in Petrograd there were over 50 unions... The metal workers' union numbered about 190,000 workers; its membership had doubled in the course of the one month of May. The influence of the Bolsheviks in the union had grown still more swiftly".

C22

"On the 9th of June a bomb was exploded at the [soviet] congress: in the morning's edition of [the Bolshevik paper] Pravda appeared an appeal for a demonstration on the following day... The masses were urging on the Bolsheviks. The garrison especially was seething – fearing that in connection with the offensive they would be... scattered along the front... The manifestation was to raise the banner of 'Power to the Soviets'. The fighting slogan ran: 'Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists'... The procession was to march to... where the congress was sitting... The question was not of overthrowing the government, but of bringing pressure on the Soviet leaders..."

"A young member of the Central Committee, proposed that they should not 'hesitate to seize the Post Office, telegraph, and arsenal, if events developed to the point of a clash'... [But] Lenin... stood firm on his April position: 'Patiently explain'."

"The congress passed a resolution forbidding all demonstrations for three days... Confronted with the categorical resolution of the congress... the Bolsheviks decided to reconsider the question... The masses submitted to the decision of the Bolsheviks, but not without protest and indignation".

Then "a representative of the Mensheviks unexpectedly moved to appoint for the following Sunday, the 18th of June, a manifestation of workers and soldiers... to demonstrate to the enemy the unity and strength of the democracy... The decision to hold a demonstration on June 18 was, of course not a step in the direction of the Bolsheviks, but an attempt to turn toward the masses as against the Bolsheviks".

"The delegates of the congress... read and counted the placards. The... same slogans were repeated again and again. 'Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists!' 'Down with the Offensive' 'All Power to the Soviets!'... Bolshevik banners floated everywhere".

"The demonstration of June 18 made an enormous impression on its own participants. The masses saw that the Bolsheviks had become a power, and the vacillating were drawn to them. In Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and many other provincial towns the demonstrations revealed an immense growth of the influence of the Bolsheviks".

5. THE JULY DAYS AND THE GREAT SLANDER: CHAPTERS 24-27 (vol.2 c.1-4 in some editions)

C24

"The deliberate closing-down of the factories from above was now becoming systematic... The supply of foodstuffs was steadily on the decrease... The counter-revolution was mobilising... The offensive... was dying in convulsions..."

On 2 July "four Kadet ministers exploded the coalition by withdrawing from the government... On the morning of July 3, several thousand machine-gunners... demanded immediate consideration of the question of an armed manifestation. The meeting was a storm from the first moment... The chairman of the meeting, a Bolshevik, Golovin, tried to apply the brakes... At three o'clock in the afternoon, two delegates from the machine-gunners came to an all-city conference of the Bolsheviks... [who decided on] an appeal in order to hold back the masses... It is impossible to talk of a manifestation at this moment unless we want a new revolution".

"At the same time the workers' section of the [Petrograd] Soviet was meeting... Convinced finally that all together they constituted only a third of the assembly, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries left the hall.. A [Bolshevik] resolution summoning the Executive Committee to take the power was adopted in the absence of the opposition by 276 votes".

"Bolshevik... leaflet... summoned the workers and soldiers 'by way of a peaceful and organized demonstration [on 4 July] to bring their will to the attention of the Executive Committees now in session'."

C25/26

"All the factories struck and held meetings... Today's [4 July] demonstration was more impressive and organised than yesterday's [3 July]: the guiding hand of the party was evident... The factories [as distinct from the soldiers] have moved into the front rank... [Yet] there were not few bloody encounters on that day..."

"The demonstrators besieged the Tauride Palace... Chernov [SR leader came] out... Someone ran into the hall... and yelled that the sailors had arrested Chernov... The Executive Committee delegated several of its prominent members, exclusively internationalists and Bolsheviks, to rescue the minister... Trotsky made a short speech... Proposing that Chernov be released, Trotsky asked all those opposed to raise their hands. Not one hand was raised..."

"The [Bolshevik-led] 17th Regiment, having come out for a demonstration against the government, defended the government against demonstrators... Zinoviev [went] out... 'I was able to make quite a long speech... Zinoviev, an orator of extraordinary power... raised the excitement of the masses to its highest note - not in order to summon them to decisive action, but to restrain them..."

"At about six o'clock in the [next] morning an automobile stopped in front of the editorial office of [the Bolshevik paper] Pravda... sentries and employees... beaten up and arrested... presses destroyed..." [C26] ... "The movement was declared an insurrection, the Bolsheviks its organisers"

"In coming out for a government of the soviet, [the workers and soldiers] by no means gave their confidence to the compromisist majority in the soviet. But they did not know how to settle with this majority. To overthrow it by violence would have meant to dissolve the soviets instead of giving them the power... Many still cherished the illusion... that by frightening the Mensheviks and SRs you could get them to carry out a common policy with the Bolsheviks".

"Were the Bolsheviks right in joining the demonstration and assuming responsibility for it?... To wash one's hands in the water of strategical morals would have meant simply to betray the workers and soldiers to their enemies. The party of the masses was compelled to stand on the same ground on which the masses stood, in order, while not in the least sharing their illusions, to help them make the necessary inferences with the least possible loss".

"The failure of the offensive became catastrophic on the 6th of July... The Menshevik papers endeavored not to fall behind the dirtiest sheets of the chauvinists. With shouts about 'Anarcho-Bolsheviks' and German agents, and about former gendarmes, they succeeded for a time in drowning out the question of the general condition of the army and of the policy of peace".

"Spartacus Week in January 1919 in Berlin belonged to the same type of intermediate, semi-revolution as the July Days in Petrograd... Spartacus Week began, not in the manner of a strategy calculated by the party, but in the manner of a pressure from the indignant lower ranks... Both organizations participating in the leadership, the Spartacus League and the Left Independents, were taken unawares... The Spartacus men were still too weak for independent leadership. The Left Independents... vacillated, and played with the insurrection, combining it with diplomatic negotiations... The young communist party was physically beheaded".

"The value of a close-knit vanguard was first fully manifested in the July Days, when the party – at great cost – defended the proletariat from defeat, and safeguarded its own future revolution".

"The anarchists in summoning the masses to battle referred to the fact that 'the February revolution also took place without the leadership of a party'. But the February revolution had its prepared tasks laid down by the struggle of whole generations, and above the February revolution stood an oppositional liberal society and a patriotic democracy ready to receive the power. The July movement, on the contrary, would have had to lay down a wholly new historic road-bed... This basic difference between the conditions of a bourgeois and a workers' revolution, the anarchists did not see, or did not understand".

C27

A "small yellow sheet... served up to its readers the next morning [5 July] an official-sounding document about Lenin's receiving directions and money from the German government. The censorship was thus broken, and within a day the whole press was full of this sensation".

"The Mensheviks were concerned to establish a formal disconnection with the slander, but nothing more".

"Lenin decided to go into hiding... Trotsky and Lunacharsky [were] arrested by military detachments on the 23rd of July".

"The war psychosis united with the pre-revolutionary political fever... The Liberals, in common with the unsuccessful generals, sought everywhere and in everybody for the hand of the Germans".

6. FROM THE JULY DAYS TO THE KORNILOV COUP: CHAPTERS 28-33 (vol.2 c.5-10 in some editions)

C28

"Prince Lvov accused the government of 'undermining' with its agrarian policy 'the popular sense of right'... The government decided that Kerensky should occupy the position of Minister-President, retaining also the portfolios of war and navy... Kerensky, Tseretelli, Chernov, Skobelev, leaders of the Executive Committee, now determined the physiognomy of the government. Was not this a realization of the slogan of the June Days, 'Down with the ten minister-capitalists'? No, this was only an exposure of its inadequacy. The minister-democrats took the power only in order to bring back the minister-capitalists... [After a long ministerial crisis] the Vice-President turned out to be the engineer Nekrasov, a left Kadet who on February 27 had proposed that they put down the revolution by turning over the power to one of the czarist generals... In the first Coalition, formed on May 6, the socialists had been in the minority, but they were in fact masters of the situation. In the ministry of July 24, the socialists were in a majority, but they were mere shadows of the Liberals... There was a change in the [military] high command. The compliant and flexible Brussilov who had replaced the cautious bureaucrat Alexeiev, the latter having opposed the offensive, was now removed, and General Kornilov named in his place".

"At the end of July the government decided to call a State Conference of all classes and social institutions of the country to meet in Moscow August 13. Membership in the conference was to be determined by the government itself".

C29

"A revolution, washing away the customary political boundary lines, surrounds everybody and everything during its first days with a rosy mist... This solidarity of the nation, founded upon loose phrases, makes of compromise an indispensable political function. Petty bourgeois idealists, overlooking class distinctions, thinking in stereotyped phrases, not knowing what they want, and wishing well to everybody, are at this stage the sole conceivable leaders of the majority. If Kerensky had possessed clear thoughts and a strong will, he would have been completely unfit for his historic rôle".

"Kornilov seriously considered himself called to 'save', and thus became a direct rival of Kerensky... The rivals quite sincerely hated each other".

"Those counter-revolutionary conferences which had followed each other in Moscow from the first days of August, beginning with a congress of landlords and ending with the Church Council, had... brought the workers and soldiers to their feet... The mood of the factories was so hostile to the State Conference that the idea of a general strike, suggested from below, was adopted almost without opposition at a meeting of representatives of all the Moscow nuclei of the Bolshevik organization. The trade-unions had taken the initiative... The strike came off magnificently... 400,000 workers went on strike in Moscow and the suburbs upon the summons of a party which for five weeks had been under continual blows, and whose leaders were still in hiding or in prison... In Kiev, Kostroma, Tzaritzyn, similar one-day strikes of protest occurred, general or partial".

C30

At the State Conference [12-15 August] Kornilov says: "By a whole series of legislative measures introduced after the revolution by people strange to the spirit and understanding of an army, the army has been converted into a crazy mob trembling only for its own life". Another general, "Kaledin developed to the full the military program of the reaction: abolish the committees, restore power to the commanders, equalize the front and the rear, reconsider the rights of the soldiers".

Cheidze responds "the democracy... had not striven after the power, and had not desired a monopoly for itself. It was prepared to support any power capable of preserving the interests of the country and the revolution. But you must not abolish the soviets: they

alone have saved the country from anarchy. You must not destroy the soldiers' committees: only they can guarantee the continuation of the war. The privileged classes must in some things act in the interests of the whole people..."

The veteran anarchist Kropotkin says: "Let us promise each other at last that we will no longer be divided into the left and right halves of this theatre. We all have one fatherland, and for her we ought all to stand together, or to lie down together if need be, both Lefts and Rights".

Kerensky: "It is unbecoming for anybody in the present assembly to address demands to the government".

C31

"The Moscow Conference damaged the position of the government [because it] raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and sharpened their impatience. On the other hand it gave a new impulse to the movement of the masses. The Moscow strike opened a period of accelerated regrouping to leftward of the workers and soldiers. Henceforth the Bolsheviks grew unconquerably. Among the masses, only the Left Social Revolutionaries, and to some extent the Left Mensheviks, held their own".

"The first conversations on the subject of a [personal] dictatorship [to resolve the political impasse] began at the beginning of June... it was assumed as a matter of course, especially by Kerensky himself, that he would occupy the center of the dictatorship.... He was a Kornilovist – only on the condition that he himself should stand at the head of the Kornilovists."

After the State Conference, "Kerensky... decided at one blow to cut the ground under the feet of Kornilov by carrying out the latter's program, and thus binding the bourgeoisie to himself".

Savinkov as go-between between Kerensky and Kornilov for a new regime "under the banner of the Provisional Government, and in particular of Kerensky. It would have to be a revolutionary dictatorship established by an iron hand. That iron hand Savinkov saw in General Kornilov..."

"The following sequence of actions was agreed upon: First concentrate a cavalry corps in Petrograd, then declare the capital under martial law, and only after that... provoke a Bolshevik insurrection..."

C32

"As early as the beginning of August, Kornilov had [moved]... four cavalry divisions... into position for the attack on Petrograd, and these were the divisions considered most useful against Bolsheviks... The Moscow Conference merely fortified Kornilov in his plans... The Allied embassies took an active part in the mobilization of the counter-revolutionary forces... 'It is time', Kornilov said... 'to hang the German agents and spies, Lenin first of all, and disperse the Soviet...'... The Kornilov operations rotated round an imaginary insurrection of the Bolsheviks..."

"The Bolsheviks debated the fundamental problems of their policy openly: a mass party cannot do otherwise. The government and headquarters could not but know that the Bolsheviks were restraining the masses, and not summoning them to action..."

"[V N] Lvov... discovering that under the appearance of a single plan there were in reality two plans, one of which was directed in a hostile manner against the other".

"By the morning of the 28th, the split between the government and the commander-in-chief had become an accomplished fact before the eyes of the whole country".

"The Committee of Struggle against Counter-Revolution had been created at a joint session of both Executive Committees, the worker-soldiers' and the peasants'... on the evening of the 27th, and consisted of specially delegated representatives of the three soviet parties from both executive committees, from the trade union centre, and from the Petrograd soviet..."

C33

"The government troops were nowhere obliged to resort to force in stopping the onslaught of the Kornilov army. The conspiracy disintegrated, crumbled, evaporated in the air... The conspiracy was conducted by those circles who were not accustomed to know how to do anything without the lower ranks, without labor forces, without cannon-fodder, without orderlies, servants, clerks, chauffeurs, messengers, cooks, laundresses, switchmen, telegraphers, stablemen, cab drivers. But all these little human bolts and links, unnoticeable, innumerable, necessary, were for the Soviet and against Kornilov..."

"Although paralyzed above by the leadership of the Compromisers, the soviets were reborn again from below at the critical moment

under pressure from the masses".

"The sailors came to the prison for a visit with... Trotsky, Raskolnikov and others. 'Isn't it time to arrest the government?' asked the visitors. 'No, not yet', was the answer. 'Use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot Kornilov. Afterward we will settle with Kerensky'."

"Kornilov... was [now] "disposed to surrender the command peacefully, provided he was assured that "a strong government will be formed"... Kerensky immediately took a step to meet his enemy, announcing by radio that the orders of General Kornilov in the sphere of military operations were obligatory upon all".

"The new chief-of-staff... was nevertheless compelled to submit to necessity, and carry out the ritual of arresting the principal conspirators".

7. THE REVIVAL AFTER THE KORNILOV COUP: CHAPTERS 34-37 (vol. 2 c.11-14)

C34

"In the official... histories the opinion has become established... that the July attack upon the party... went by almost without leaving a traced... That is utterly untrue... Fright, disappointment, apathy, flowed down differently in different parts of the country, but... everywhere... The decline in the ranks of the party and the ebbing away of workers and soldiers did not, to be sure, last very long..."

"The sharp turn in the mood of the masses produced an automatic, and moreover an unerring, selection within the cadres of the party. Those who did not tremble in those days could be relied on absolutely in what was to come".

"The masses were entering upon [their] path in a state of struggle with their own past, with their yesterday's beliefs, and partly also with their beliefs of today... At a moment of failure and disappointment, the old prejudices not yet burnt out would flare up... The political development of the masses proceeds not in a direct line, but in a complicated curve".

In August "a wave of big strikes and other conflicts swept over the whole country. While the more experienced ranks of the proletariat moved cautiously, the new and fresh layers went the more resolutely into the fight... Kiev... a riotous strike of the nightwatchmen and janitors".

C35

"Every factory had its Bolsheviks. 'Do I look like a German spy, boys, eh?' a fitter would ask, or a cabinet-maker, whose whole life-history was known to the workers... Out of these moods, together with a feeling of guilt before the Bolsheviks [over the July slander], grew an unconquerable loyalty to the party and confidence in its leaders".

"Some sort of elections were going on every day – to the dumas, the zemstvos, the soviets, the factory and shop committees, the trade unions, the army or land committees. And throughout all these elections there appears like a red thread one unchanging fact: the growth of the Bolsheviks".

"On September 8, the Baltic sailors... demanded an immediate armistice on all fronts, the transfer of land to the peasant committees, and the establishment of workers' control of production. Three days later the central committee of the Black Sea Fleet... supported the Baltic sailors, adopting the slogan of Power to the Soviets. The same slogan was adopted in the middle of September by 23 Siberian and Lettish infantry regiments of the Twelfth Army... The demand for Power to the Soviets never again disappeared from the order of the day in the army or the fleet.. the best and most tightly disciplined army, not only on the Northern front but perhaps on the whole Russian front, the Fifth Army, was the first to elect a Bolshevik army committee".

The "process of fading out of the soviets [in July] was crossed, however, by processes of another and partly opposite character. Far-off frontiers, backward counties, and inaccessible corners were waking up and creating their own soviets, and these would manifest a revolutionary freshness until they fell under the demoralizing influence of the centre, or under the repressions of the government. The total number of soviets was growing rapidly. At the end of August, the secretariat of the Executive Committee counted as many as 600 soviets, behind which stood 23 million electors. The official soviet system had been raised up over a human ocean which was billowing powerfully and driving its waves leftward... The political revival of the soviets, which coincided with their Bolshevization, began from the bottom... Many of the provincial soviets had already, before the July days, become organs of power..."

"The Social Revolutionary party, as it withered and weakened, also began to split along a social seam, in this process throwing its members over into hostile camps... After the July Days the Left Social Revolutionaries came out in open opposition – still not breaking formally with the party, but belatedly catching up the arguments and slogans of the Bolsheviks".

"On the night of September 1, while still under the presidency of Cheidze, the [Petrograd] Soviet voted for a government of workers and peasants... On the 5th, the Moscow soviet followed in the steps of the Petrograd... The dominance of the Bolshevik party in the Petrograd Soviet was dramatically certified at the historic session of September 9... The Petrograd Soviet, the parent of all the other soviets, henceforth stood under the leadership of the Bolsheviks..."

C36

"The means and implements of the Bolshevik agitation seem... completely out of proportion to the political influence of Bolshevism... The intelligentsia hardly came into the Bolshevik party at all. A broad layer of so-called 'old Bolsheviks', from among the students who had associated themselves with the revolution of 1905, had since turned into extraordinarily successful engineers, physicians, government officials, and they now unceremoniously showed the party the hostile aspect of their backs. Even in Petrograd there was felt at every step a lack of journalists, speakers, agitators; and the provinces were wholly deprived of what few they had had..."

"The explanation... The Bolshevik papers were read aloud, were read all to pieces. The most important articles were learned by heart, recited, copied, and wherever possible reprinted".

"The usual explanation of the success of Bolshevism reduced itself to a remark upon 'the simplicity of its slogans'... The Bolsheviks were free from unexpressed or semi-expressed gospels reducing themselves in the last analysis to a defence of private property. However, that distinction alone does not exhaust the matter... Revolutions are always verbose, and the Bolsheviks did not escape from this law. But... the agitation of the Bolsheviks was distinguished by its concentrated and well thought-out character. The Compromisers talked themselves out of difficulties; the Bolsheviks went to meet them... The Bolshevik policy... the direct opposite of demagoguism and adventurism".

"The whole of August, and especially the latter half, was marked by continual warnings from the party to the workers and soldiers: Do not go into the street..."

"The [Bolsheviks' late-July] congress decided at the same time to withdraw the central slogan of the preceding period: transfer of power to the soviets... "

[Lenin wrote in late August]: "We ought not even now to support the government of Kerensky. That would be unprincipled. You ask: But mustn't we fight Kornilov? Of course, yes. But that is not the same thing. There is a limit here. Some of the Bolsheviks are crossing it, slipping into 'compromisism', getting carried away by the flood of events."

"On the 3rd of September Lenin wrote... The rôle of the soviets has again changed, he declared: At the beginning of July they were organs of struggle against the proletariat. At the end of August they have become organs of struggle against the bourgeoisie... return to our pre-July demand: All power to the soviets, a government of Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks responsible to the soviets... The Compromisers refused... By virtue of this fact, the slogan 'Power to the Soviets' was again suspended. However, not for long: In the next few days the Bolsheviks got a majority in the Petrograd Soviet, and afterward in a number of others. The phrase 'Power to the soviets' was not, therefore, again removed from the order of the day, but received a new meaning: All power to the Bolshevik soviets".

"Throughout the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party there runs the assertion that, as a result of the July events, the dual power has been liquidated and replaced by a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie... The formula of the Sixth Congress was, to say the least, inaccurate..."

C37

"The Provisional Government went to pieces... on the night of August 26. The Kadets withdrew in order to make it easier for Kornilov. The socialists withdrew in order to make it easier for Kerensky... As early as the 31st [Kerensky] had formed a new government with the participation of Kadets".

"On the 4th of September Trotsky was set free... The liberation of Bolsheviks... continued during the next few days".

"The convocation of a 'Democratic Conference' had been decided upon in the days of the Kornilov insurrection... The Compromisers seriously intended to subject the government to some sort of improvised representative institution until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.. The Democratic Conference opened on the 14th of September. The Bolsheviks... were... more than a third of the whole assembly".

"At the Democratic Conference 766 deputies against 688 voted for a coalition, with 38 abstaining. The two camps were almost equal! An amendment excluding the Kadets from the coalition got a majority: 595 against 493, with 72 abstaining. But the removal of the Kadets made a coalition entirely purposeless. For that reason the resolution as a whole was voted down by a majority of 813... A praesidium was assembled... 56 hands against 48 with 10 abstaining were raised in favor of filling out the body [the

Democratic Conference] with representatives of the bourgeoisie... Having been filled out with the necessary proportion of bourgeois representatives, the future Council of the Republic, or Pre-Parliament, would have as its task the sanctioning of a coalition government with the Kadets."

"On the 20th of September, the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks called a party conference... Trotsky proposed the slogan of boycotting the Pre-Parliament... By a majority of 77 votes against 50, this party conference rejected the slogan of boycott... [But] the party promptly corrected its leaders".

"The Bolsheviks... had not yet renounced the idea of the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, they could not do this without abandoning revolutionary realism. Whether the future course of events would create the conditions for a complete victory of the proletariat could not with absolute certainty be foreseen. Exactly as the Bolsheviks defended the compromisist soviets and the democratic municipalities against Kornilov, so they were ready to defend the Constituent Assembly against the attempts of the bourgeoisie".

8. THE PEASANTRY AND THE NATIONALITIES: CHAPTERS 38-39 (vol.3 c.1-2)

C38

"In the first stage the peasants were still accommodating themselves to the new régime, and trying to solve their problems by means of the new institutions... From July on... cases of direct attack upon the landlords' manors... begin to increase... The number of properties affected by agrarian conflicts in September rose 30 per cent over that in August; in October, 43 per cent over that in September. In September and the first three weeks of October there occurred over a third as many agrarian conflicts as all those recorded since March".

"These waves of bitter feeling raised up no little slime from the bottom. In Kostroma province... a Black Hundred and anti-Jew agitation is observed... Wherever the Bolsheviks had succeeded in putting down firm roots, they naturally tried, without weakening the assault of the peasants, to regulate its forms and decrease the amount of destruction".

"In April Lenin had... insisted upon the creation of special soviets of farm hands' deputies, and upon independent organisations of the poorest peasantry. Month by month it became clear, however, that this part of the Bolshevik policy would not take root. Except in the Baltic state there were no soviets of farm hands. The peasant poor also failed to find independent forms of organisation... The chief cause lay in the substance of the historic task itself – a democratic agrarian revolution... The land and executive committees, on the other hand, although state organs in design, became – strange as it may seem at a first glance – the organs of the peasant revolution... In the autumn period of the peasant movement... what oftenest appears upon the scene is the 'old peasant assembly'... The peasant movement of 1917 was directed in its social foundations not against capitalism, but against the relics of serfdom. The struggle against kulakism developed only later, in 1918, after the conclusive liquidation of the landlord".

"Intending to dicker with the landlords at the Constituent Assembly regarding prices but end things in a friendly manner, the Social Revolutionaries zealously kept the muzhik away from the land. They went to pieces, therefore, not on the Utopian character of their socialism, but on their democratic inconsistency. It might have taken years to test out their Utopianism. Their betrayal of agrarian democracy became clear in a few months. Under a government of Social Revolutionaries the peasants had to take the road of insurrection in order to carry out the Social Revolutionary programme."

"From May to June there were created in Petrograd back-home clubs corresponding to different provinces, counties and even villages... Not long before the uprising, these clubs united round a special central bureau under the leadership of the Bolsheviks. This back-home club movement soon spread to Moscow, Tver, and probably to a number of other industrial cities... However, in the matter of direct influence upon the village the soldiers were still more important."

"An empire of whose population the ruling nationality constituted only 43 per cent. The remaining 57 per cent, were nationalities of various degrees of culture and subjection, including Ukrainians 17 per cent, Poles 6 per cent, White Russians 4½ per cent..."

"Lenin... for many years stubbornly fought – most particularly against Rosa Luxemburg – for... the right of nations to self-determination – that is, to complete separation as states. In this the Bolshevik Party did not by any means undertake an evangel of separation. It merely assumed an obligation to struggle implacably against every form of national oppression, including the forcible retention of this or that nationality within the boundaries of the general state. Only in this way could the Russian proletariat gradually win the confidence of the oppressed nationalities".

"Within the framework of the party, and of the workers' organisations in general, Bolshevism... made it a verily sacred task to unite as closely as possible, by means of voluntary class discipline, the workers of different nationalities. Thus it flatly rejected the national-federation principle in building the party".

"The compromisist democracy [argued] it was now a question of defending the unity of the revolution. But the ruling coalition had also another more pointed argument: wartime expediency... The new government... hope[d] and endeavour[ed] to stop at a mere

annulment of the exceptional laws against individual nations".

"In the Ukraine and White Russia the landlord, capitalist, lawyer, journalist, was a Great Russian, a Pole, a Jew, a foreigner; the rural population was wholly Ukrainian and White Russian. In the Baltic states the cities were havens of the German, Russian and Jewish bourgeoisie; the country was altogether Lettish and Esthonian. In the cities of Georgia, a Russian and Armenian population predominated, as also in Turkish Azerbaidjan... the landlords, industrialists and merchants in these borderlands grouped around themselves a narrow circle of Russian functionaries, clerks, teachers, physicians, lawyers, journalists, and to some extent workers also, converting the cities into centres of Russification and colonisation".

"The soviets... being predominantly city organisations... would frequently ignore the national interests of the basic population. This was one cause of the weakness of the soviets in the Ukraine... Under a false banner of internationalism the soviets would frequently wage a struggle against the defensive nationalism of the Ukrainians or Mussulmans, supplying a screen for the oppressive Russifying movement of the cities. A little time after, under the rule of the Bolsheviks, the soviets of these borderlands began to speak the language of the villages".

"When Rosa Luxemburg, in her posthumous polemic... asserted that Ukrainian nationalism, having been formerly a mere 'amusement' of the commonplace petty bourgeois intelligentsia, had been artificially raised up by the yeast of the Bolshevik formula of self-determination, she fell, notwithstanding her luminous mind, into a very serious historic error... The chief service of the February revolution – perhaps its only service, but one amply sufficient – lay exactly in this, that it gave the oppressed classes and nations of Russia at last an opportunity to speak out. This political awakening of the [Ukrainian] peasantry could not have taken place otherwise, however, than through their own native language – with all the consequences ensuing in regard to schools, courts, self-administration..."

"In order to understand the real character of Lenin's policy on the national question, it is a good idea – following the method of contrasts – to compare it with the policy of the Austrian social democrats... the project of a so-called 'national-cultural autonomy' which should unite [each nationality] throughout the whole [multinational] country around schools and other institutions".

9. FROM SEPTEMBER TO THE EVE OF REVOLUTION: CHAPTERS 40-41 (vol.3 c.3-4)

C40

"The so-called 'democratic' majority of the Pre-Parliament [when it assembled on 7 October] consisted of... 120 Social Revolutionaries, among them about 20 Lefts, 60 Mensheviks of various shades, 66 Bolsheviks... Together with the Co-operators, the Cossacks, and the rather conservative members of Kerensky's Executive Committee, the Right Wing on a number of questions came near being a majority... When the Pre-Parliament assembled for its first session, a weight was lifted, says Miliukov, from the hearts of many sceptics: 'It will be fine if the Constituent Assembly is no worse than this'... [A] decision to withdraw demonstratively... was adopted on the 5th at a meeting of the Bolshevik faction by all votes except one. So great had been the shift leftward during the preceding two weeks!"

"On the 10th the debate opened on improving the fighting capacity of the army... We must convince the army that it is fighting for peace and democracy, said the Left. We must not convince but compel, answered the Right... [On 18 October] the formula of the Social Revolutionaries got 95 votes against 127, with 50 abstaining. The formula of the Right got 135 votes against 139... There was no majority".

Meanwhile "fraternising, which had almost stopped since the July days, began again and grew rapidly. Instances not only of the arrest of officers by the soldiers, but of the murder of the more hateful, began to multiply..."

"[In the cities] brilliant agitation was conducted by Volodarsky, Lashevich, Kollontai, Chudnovsky, and after them by scores of agitators of lesser calibre. People listened with interest and sympathy... to Lunacharsky, a skilled orator... Every Petrograd worker and soldier knew [Trotsky] and heard him personally... Incomparably more effective in that last period before the insurrection was the molecular agitation carried on by nameless workers, sailors, soldiers, winning converts one by one, breaking down the last doubts, overcoming the last hesitations. Those months of feverish political life had created innumerable cadres in the lower ranks... The Petrograd workers... had produced a race of agitators and organisers of extraordinary revolutionary temper and high political culture, independent in thought, word and action. Carpenters, fitters, blacksmiths, teachers of the unions and factories, each already had around him his school, his pupils, the future builders of the Republic of Soviets... Bolshevism took possession of the country..."

"The All-Russian conference of factory and shop committees, meeting during the second half of October, raised the question of workers' control to the position of a national problem... The government of the soviets was not a chimera, an arbitrary construction, an invention of party theoreticians. It grew up irresistibly from below, from the breakdown of industry, the impotence of the possessors, the needs of the masses... The soviets had in actual fact become a government. For the workers, soldiers and peasants there remained no other road. No time left to argue and speculate about a Soviet government: it had to be realised".

"On September 21, at the close of the Democratic Conference, the Petrograd Soviet raised its voice for the prompt calling of a

congress of the soviets... The Congress was called for October 20... On the 26th September [a Menshevik leader] made haste to introduce... a proposal to postpone the Congress... On the 24th of September the Central Committee of the [Bolshevik] party, without banking upon any action by the Central Executive Committee, had decided to set in motion from below, through the local soviets and organisations of the front, a campaign for the Congress... The struggle for and against the Congress gave the last impulse in the localities to the Bolshevisation of the soviets".

"Not one party had yet withdrawn the slogan of the Constituent Assembly, and this included the Bolsheviks. But almost unnoticeably in the course of the events of the revolution, this chief democratic slogan, which had for a decade and a half tinged with its colour the heroic struggle of the masses, had grown pale and faded out..."

C41

"After the [Kornilov] revolt of the generals the Compromisers swiftly lost their following in the [Petrograd] garrison. Distrust of the Bolshevik was replaced by sympathy, or at the worst by a watchful neutrality".

"The plan of the [military staff] was not bad: presenting a peremptory strategic demand to the Soviet to snatch their military support from under the feet of the Bolsheviks [by sending units from Petrograd to the front], or in case the Soviet resisted, to provoke a sharp conflict between the Petrograd garrison and the front, which was in need of supplementary forces and replacements".

"The leaders of the Soviet, quite well aware of the trap which had been set for them, made up their minds to feel out the ground carefully before taking any irrevocable step. A flat refusal to fulfil the order was possible only if they were sure that the motives of the refusal would be correctly understood by the front".

"Attempting to kindle the patriotism of the masses by threatening the loss of Petrograd, the Compromisers introduced into the Soviet on October 9 a motion to create a 'Committee of Revolutionary Defence' whose task should be to take part in the defence of the capital with the active co-operation of the workers... The Bolsheviks... seized upon this Menshevik project of a military committee... The patriotic proposal of the Mensheviks... came up just in time to assist in the creation of a revolutionary headquarters – a body soon to be renamed 'Military Revolutionary Committee' and to become the chief lever of the revolution... The Military Revolutionary Committee... went to work... on the 20th... Being boycotted by the Compromisers, the staff of the Committee contained only Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries".

"Under the direction of the Military Revolutionary Committee there was created a Permanent Conference of the Garrison... [On 12 October] the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet made public the creation under its supervision of a special department of the Red Guard... The suspicious attitude of the soldiers toward the Red Guard was already far in the past. On the contrary, almost all the resolutions of the regiments contained a demand for the arming of the workers".

[Trotsky explained]: "It is known to the bourgeoisie that the Petrograd Soviet is going to propose to the Congress of Soviets that they seize the power ... And foreseeing an inevitable battle, the bourgeois classes are trying to disarm Petrograd."

"The [Petrograd] Soviet openly designated Sunday the 22nd as the day for a peaceful review of its forces – not, however, in the form of street processions, but of meetings in the factories, barracks, and all the major institutions of Petrograd... The bourgeoisie... remained at home... All the rest of the population thronged out to meetings from early morning to night – young and old, men and women, boys and girls, mothers with children in their arms. No meetings like this had been seen before throughout the revolution".

[On 23 October at] "the evening meeting of the Soviet... Antonov drew a picture of the crowding out of the governmental organs step by step with the agents of the Military Revolutionary Committee. These agents, he said, are being received everywhere as natural authorities... through principle..."

"It had become clear on the 19th that the majority of the committees of the Peter and Paul fortress were unfavourably, or at least dubiously, disposed... Trotsky and Lashevich went to a meeting in the fortress... The soldiers listened to us and they came with us".

10. THE BOLSHEVIKS DEBATE INSURRECTION: CHAPTERS 42-43 (vol.3 c.5-6)

"During the first months of his underground life Lenin wrote a book *The State and Revolution*, the principal material for which he had collected abroad during the war... With its meticulous selection of quotations, its detailed polemical interpretations, the book might seem pedantic... [but] Lenin gives to the ideas of Marx a new concreteness and therewith a new significance... [The book] constituted the scientific introduction to the greatest revolution in history".

"After the July raids Lenin declared... 'we must... rely... on the factory committees; the soviets as organs of power will have to be created anew after the victory'. As a matter of fact, only two months after that the Bolsheviks had won over the soviets from the Compromisers... For the boldest designs [Lenin] based his calculations upon the least favourable premises..."

"In his articles and letters [from hiding] Lenin analyses the situation, always emphasising first of all the international conditions... He regarded the very conquest of power in Russia primarily as the impetus for a European revolution..."

"Lenin very studiously followed all the elections and votings in the country, carefully assembling those figures which would throw light on the actual correlation of forces... Lenin with his sharp eye was the first to notice that the agrarian movement had gone into a decisive phase..."

"Impressed by the decomposition of the Democratic Conference, [Lenin argued] we ought to organise a staff of insurrectionary detachments, deploy our forces... arrest the General Staff and the government... Slogan of this kind... The power must immediately pass to the Petrograd Soviet which will hand it over to the Congress of Soviets... In the Central Committee itself Lenin's plan found no support whatever".

10 October: meeting of Bolshevik Central Committee with Lenin present. "Twelve of the twenty-one members of the Central Committee were present... The session lasted about ten hours – deep into the night. [Vote 10 to 2 - Zinoviev and Kamenev - to steer to insurrection but] in every organisation of the party, in every one of its provincial committees, there were people of the same mood as Zinoviev and Kamenev. In many committees they were the majority".

"On the 17th... the Central Executive Committee transferred the opening of the Soviet Congress to the 25th..."

16 October Bolshevik CC meeting: "Krylenko... disagreed with Lenin 'on the question who shall begin it and how it shall begin'... 'The question of the removal of the troops is just that fighting issue upon which the struggle is taking place ... The attack upon us is thus already a fact, and this we can make use of ... It is not necessary to worry about who shall begin, for the thing is already begun' Krylenko was expounding and defending the policy laid down by the Military Revolutionary Committee and the Garrison Conference. It was along this road that the insurrection continued to develop".

"On the 17th... the Central Executive Committee transferred the opening of the Soviet Congress to the 25th... On the [same] day Kamenev, in agreement with Zinoviev, gave to Gorky's paper a declaration attacking the decision adopted [by the Bolshevik CC] the night before. 'Not only Zinoviev and I, but also a number of practical comrades', – thus wrote Kamenev – 'think that to take the initiative in an armed insurrection at the present moment... is an inadmissible step'... Their plan was to enter as a strong opposition party into the Constituent Assembly, which 'in its revolutionary work can rely only upon the soviets'. Hence their formula: 'Constituent Assembly and soviets – that, is, the combined type of state institution toward which we are travelling'..."

"Kamenev, desiring to free his hands for agitation against the insurrection, resigned from the Central Committee... Trotsky... moved that Kamenev's resignation be accepted. Sverdlov, supporting Trotsky's motion, read a letter of Lenin branding Zinoviev and Kamenev as strikebreakers for their declaration in Gorky's paper, and demanding their expulsion from the party... Stalin spoke against the acceptance of Kamenev's resignation, arguing that 'our whole situation is self-contradictory'... Kamenev's resignation was accepted by 5 votes against 3".

"To each new situation the party adapted itself only by way of an inner crisis... The approach of an insurrection has inevitably produced, and always will produce, crisis in the insurrectionary parties... The high temper of the Bolshevik party expressed itself not in an absence of disagreements, waverings, and even quakings, but in the fact that in the most difficult circumstances it gathered itself in good season by means of inner crises... Bolshevism created the type of the authentic revolutionist, who subordinates to historic goals irreconcilable with contemporary society the conditions of his personal existence, his ideas, and his moral judgments... By a process of selection and education – and in continual struggle – the Bolshevik party created not only a political but a moral medium of its own, independent of bourgeois social opinion and implacably opposed to it. Only this permitted the Bolsheviks to overcome the waverings in their own ranks".

C43

"'Spontaneous' insurrection cannot transcend the framework of the bourgeois régime..."

"The majority is not counted up, but won over. Insurrection comes into being at exactly that moment when direct action alone offers a way out of the contradictions..."

11. THE OCTOBER INSURRECTION: CHAPTERS 44-48 (vol.3 c.7-10)

C44

"On the night of the 24th the government... passed a resolution: to institute legal proceedings against the Military Revolutionary Committee; to shut down the Bolshevik papers advocating insurrection; to summon reliable military detachments from the environs and from the front... The Minister of Justice... gave an order for the immediate arrest of... Bolsheviks released under bail... primarily Trotsky... At five-thirty in the morning a government commissar with a detachment of junkers showed up at the Bolshevik printing-

plant, and... The stereotypes were smashed, the building sealed... The military schools of the capital were ordered to make ready for battle. The cruiser Aurora moored in the Neva, its crew favourable to the Bolsheviks, was ordered to put out and join the rest of the fleet..."

"These pin-pricks were just sufficient to convict the government of preparing a counter-revolutionary coup d'état. Although an insurrection can win on the offensive, it develops better, the more it looks like self-defence..."

"It suddenly becomes known that within the [Peter and Paul] fortress itself the situation is not assured. The uncertainty lies in a bicycle battalion... 'We decided to hold a special meeting for the bicycle men', writes Blagonravov... This supplementary oratorical battle for the Peter and Paul fortress ended as might have been foreseen: by all voices except thirty the battalion supported the resolution of Trotsky..."

"The final act of the revolution seems, after all this, too brief, too dry, too business-like... As a matter of fact it was the most popular mass-insurrection in all history... The scattered government patrols... being convinced in advance of their own isolation, renounced the very idea of resistance..."

"Kamenev... although sharing the views of Zinoviev, was very active in the headquarters of the insurrection".

"At 2.35 in the afternoon... an emergency session of the Petrograd Soviet was opened with a report by Trotsky, who in the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee announced that the Provisional Government no longer existed... Lenin, who appeared here publicly for the first time after emerging from underground, briefly outlined the programme of the revolution: To break up the old governmental apparatus; to create a new system of administration through the soviets; to take measures for the immediate cessation of war, relying upon revolutionary movements in other countries; to abolish the landlords' property rights and thus win the confidence of the peasants; to establish workers' control over production".

C45

"I announce to you, members of the Provisional Government, that you are under arrest – exclaimed Antonov in the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee. The clock then pointed to 2.10 in the morning of October 26... There were no shootings and, the mood of both sides being what it was at that period, there could not have been any shootings. Still less thinkable were acts of violence, especially within the palace where alongside of various accidental elements from the streets, hundreds of revolutionary workers came in with rifles in their hands... Attempts at looting were actually made, but... somebody shouted: 'Comrades, keep your hands off, that is the property of the people'. A soldier sat down at a table by the entrance with pen and paper: two Red Guards with revolvers stood behind him. Everyone going out was searched, and every object stolen was taken back and listed".

C46

"'First conquer Kerensky and then call the Congress', Lenin kept repeating... Lenin had... not yet appreciated the new factor which had intruded into the preparation of the insurrection and changed its whole character, the sharp conflict between the Petrograd garrison and the government... It would have been wrong politically... to separate the preparation of the insurrection from the preparation for the Congress of Soviets".

"Demonstrations, street fights, barricades – everything comprised in the usual idea of insurrection – were almost entirely absent... The tranquillity of the October streets, the absence of crowds and battles, gave the enemy a pretext to talk of the conspiracy of an insignificant minority, of the adventure of a handful of Bolsheviks... But in reality the Bolsheviks could reduce the struggle for power at the last moment to a 'conspiracy', not because they were a small minority, but for the opposite reason – because they had behind them in the workers' districts and the barracks an overwhelming majority, consolidated, organised, disciplined".

C47-48

"In Smolny on the 25th of October the most democratic of all parliaments in the world's history was to meet... A straw-vote taken among the delegates revealed that 505 soviets stood for the transfer of all power to the soviets; 86 for a government of the 'democracy'; 55 for a coalition; 21 for a coalition, but without the Kadets".

"The opening of the Congress was delayed... At 8 o'clock the Mensheviks demanded a new delay: they had too many opinions... The session [opens] at 10.40 in the evening... In the name of the Bolsheviks... Avanessov moves that the presidium be elected upon a proportional basis: 14 Bolsheviks, 7 Social Revolutionaries, 3 Mensheviks and 1 Internationalist. The Right immediately declines to enter the presidium".

"Martov [says] 'A peaceful solution of the crisis can be obtained by creating a government which will be recognised by the whole democracy'... The Bolsheviks send Lunacharsky to the tribune... 'The Bolshevik faction', he says, 'has absolutely nothing against Martov's proposal'... Martov's proposal is adopted unanimously".

"[A] Right Menshevik [says]: the sole way out: 'Open negotiations with the Provisional Government [for a new coalition]'... The Right SRs... declare the very Congress of Soviets, although convoked and opened by the compromiser Central Executive Committee, to be without authority... Withdrawal of the Rights..."

[Trotsky responds]: "To those who have gone out... we must say... Go where you belong from now on – into the rubbish-can of history!". "'Then we will go!' cries Martov without awaiting the vote of the Congress..."

"Lunacharsky at last got a chance to read a proclamation.. 'The Congress assumes the power ...' The Soviet Government proposes immediate peace. It will transfer the land to the peasants, democratise the army, establish control over production, promptly summon the Constituent Assembly, guarantee the right of the nations of Russia to self-determination... 'The Congress resolves: That all power in the localities goes over to the soviets'... For the third time a group of Mensheviks, obviously the most leftward now, broke away from the Congress..."

[Peace declaration put to Congress]. "In order to enter upon negotiations, it is proposed to conclude an immediate armistice, for not less than three months at least. The workers' and peasant" government addresses its proposals simultaneously to 'the governments and peoples of all warring countries ... especially the conscious workers of the three most advanced countries', England, France and Germany... Lenin... 'We cannot ignore the governments, for then the possibility of concluding peace will be delayed ... but... the people and the governments are everywhere at variance, and we ought to help the people interfere in the matter of war and peace'. 'We will, of course, defend in all possible ways our programme of peace without annexations or indemnities' but we ought not to present our conditions in the form of an ultimatum, as that will make it easier for the governments to refuse to negotiate..."

"Suddenly, by common impulse... we found ourselves on our feet, mumbling together into the smooth lifting unison of the Internationale. A grizzled old soldier was sobbing like a child".

"Decree on land... The landlord's property in the land is annulled immediately and without any indemnity whatever... 242 instructions [had been] given by the electors to their representatives at the First Congress of Peasant Deputies. Notwithstanding that it was the Social Revolutionaries who prepared these collated instructions, Lenin did not hesitate to attach the document in its entirety to his decree 'for guidance'..."

"After the adoption, unanimously and without debate, of a resolution declaring it an affair of honour of the local soviets not to permit Jewish or any other pogroms... a vote is taken on the draft of the land law".

"The Council of People's Commissars was ratified by an overwhelming majority... The Congress then unanimously confirmed the membership of the new Central Executive Committee: out of 101 members – 62 Bolsheviks, 29 Left Social Revolutionaries... The factions who had abandoned the Congress were granted the right to send their delegates to the Central Executive Committee on the basis of proportional representation".

12. PERMANENT REVOLUTION AND "SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY": APPENDICES (especially II and III)

Appendices

The Appendix on "Legends of the Bureaucracy" was written to combat Stalinist distortions then being pushed by large and vigorous Communist Parties. It should be read, but is less important today.

Socialism in a Separate Country?

"'The industrially more developed country shows the less developed only the image of its own future'. This statement of Marx... has become less applicable in proportion as capitalist evolution has embraced all countries... England in her day revealed the future of France, considerably less of Germany, but not in the least of Russia and not of India..."

"The productive forces of our time have outgrown... the boundaries of national states... The creation of a national socialist society, if such a goal were in a general way attainable, would mean an extreme reduction of the economic power of men. But for that very reason it is unattainable".

"Up to 1917 the party never admitted even the idea that the proletarian revolution might be achieved in Russia before it was achieved in the west... [Even in 1917] the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia was for the Bolsheviks a bridge to a revolution in the west. The problem of a socialist transformation of society was proclaimed to be in its very essence international".

[When the Stalinists started talking about Socialism in One Country they tried to forbid: "denial of the possibility of the Soviet Union's maintaining itself for an indefinite length of time in a capitalist environment (problem of military intervention); denial of the

possibility of its overcoming with its own power, and within its national boundaries, the contradiction between city and country (problem of economic backwardness and agrarian problem); denial of the possibility of creating a shut-in socialist society (problem of the worldwide division of labour)".

"In January 1919, at the height of military communism, Lenin said: 'We will defend the foundations of our communist policy in production and we will carry them through unshaken to the time of the complete and worldwide victory of communism'. Together with the whole party Lenin was mistaken... Even if the socialist revolution in Europe had taken place during the first two or three years after October, a retreat along the line of the New Economic Policy would have been inevitable just the same".

Historic References on the Theory of "Permanent Revolution

1905-1917

T.: The Russian revolution cannot solve its democratic problem, above all the agrarian problem, without placing the working class in power.

S.: But does not that mean the dictatorship of the proletariat?

T.: Unquestionably.

S.: In backward Russia? Before it happens in the advanced capitalist countries?

T.: Exactly so.

S.: But you are ignoring the Russian village – that is, the backward peasantry stuck in the mud of semi-serfdom.

T.: On the contrary, it is only the depth of the agrarian problem that opens the immediate prospect of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

S.: You reject, then, the bourgeois revolution?

T.: No, I only try to show that its dynamic leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

S.: But that means that Russia is ripe for the building of socialism?

T.: No, it does not. Historic evolution has no such planned and harmonious character. The conquest of power by the proletariat in backward Russia flows inexorably from the correlation of forces in the bourgeois revolution. What further economic prospects will be opened by the dictatorship of the proletariat depends upon the domestic and world conditions under which it is inaugurated. It goes without saying that Russia cannot arrive at socialism independently. But once having opened an era of socialist transformation, she can supply the impetus to a socialist development of Europe and thus arrive at socialism in the wake of the advanced countries

1917-1923

S.: We must acknowledge that Trotsky "even before the revolution of 1905 advanced the original and now especially famous theory of Permanent Revolution, asserting that the bourgeois revolution of 1905 would go directly over into a socialist revolution and prove the first of a series of national revolutions." (The quotation is from the notes to the Complete Works of Lenin, published during his life.)

1924-1932

S.: And so you deny that our revolution can arrive at socialism?

T.: I think, as before, that our revolution can and should lead to socialism after having acquired an international character.

S.: You do not believe, then, in the inner forces of the Russian revolution?

T.: Strange that this did not prevent me from foreseeing and preaching the dictatorship of the proletariat when you rejected it as Utopian.

S.: But you none the less deny the socialist revolution in Russia?

T.: Until April 1917 you accused me of rejecting the bourgeois revolution. The secret of your theoretical contradictions lies in the fact that you got way behind the historic process and now you are trying to catch up and pass it. To tell the truth, this also is the secret of your industrial mistakes.