London Underground assured us it was ‘safe’ to work on the day of the firefighters’ strike. The same people claimed it was ‘safe’ during our recent LU strikes - while opening section 12 stations under minimum numbers, or with managers with two hours’ training, trapping passengers in closed stations ...
Can we leave our safety in their hands? Their goal is to run a service at all costs, especially when they wish to undermine a strike.
LU scraped the barrel for safety assurances for the firefighters’ strike. They pointed out that ‘smoking is not permitted on stations or trains’. Smoking is not permitted in any public area, but we still need fire cover! Anyone could light a fag at any time– not to mention all the other fire hazards.
They praised the virtues of the ‘automatic smoke and heat detectors, directly linked to sprinkler systems installed at Underground stations’. It was precisely this equipment that failed at the Euston fire in June when undetected smoke from an escalator machine chamber was only spotted by a member of staff! The Euston fire’s investigation concluded the detectors were working correctly; it was just the wrong kind of smoke. So how reliable is LU’s fire detection system combine-wide? How can LU base their safety assurance on this provably faulty system?
They say that with prompt evacuations, no customers are reliant on the fire brigade. But what if the fire had not been detected and passengers were trapped underground?
What about lift stations? During the last FBU strike, all lift stations were closed. Why are they suddenly safe? In the past it has been the responsibility the fire service, not lift engineers, to carry passengers trapped in lifts to safety.
LU’s own rule book says a fire officer should attend some scenarios before the Station Supervisor can reset the fire control panel. But the strike contingency plans say: ‘for the period of the proposed industrial action....the function of resettling the control panel will be undertaken by the licensed engineer/ accredited representative attending the incident’. So they have literally re-written the rules for the duration of the strike!
There was insufficient fire cover on the day. The FBU strike was so solid that only 14 out of 90 engines were available. The back-up scab fire cover, provided by CapitalGuard, could only guarantee 27 for the whole of London.
The back-up service was similar to London Underground’s desperate staffing attempts during a strike. They had no blue light status, so relied on police escort. After four accidents, and the service dwindled throughout the day. The Evening Standard reported that it took 20-30 mins for the scab service to turn up to a roof fire; they couldn’t put the nozzles on the hoses, and were shooting water into the air rather than at the fire.
Drivers on the Picadilly, Jubilee, Northern, Victoria lines and station staff at Kings Cross and elsewhere rejected LU’s phoney safety assurances and refused work on safety grounds. They faced down significant intimidation by managers. On the Jubilee, senior managers were waiting to intimidate drivers at the desk where they booked on. But by the afternoon, there were only three trains shuttling between Stratford and North Greenwich. There were 30-40 refusals on the Piccadilly Line: the messroom was full and the line practically suspended.
It can be difficult to take a stand on your own. The refusals worked best where a large number of staff were prepared to stand together. But if you feel in ‘serious and imminent danger’, you have the legal right to refuse to work on safety grounds. Write a memo listing your safety concerns. Your manager will give you 15 minutes to read their pack of assurances. If you are not reassured, you can inform them that you do not wish to carry out your normal duty. Following last Saturday, we will see that the company cannot discipline anyone who exercises their legal right.
